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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
The names of all parties to the proceedings in the lower court
are set forth in the caption of the case on appeal.
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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j), as amended.

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did

the

district

court

correctly

rule, based

upon the

undisputed facts, that the termination of plaintiff's employment
with the County as part of a mandatory reduction in force was in
compliance with the applicable provisions of the governing personnel
manual?

The district court's interpretation of the terms of the

manual is a conclusion of law which is reviewed for correctness by
this Court. L.D..S. Hospital v. Capitol Life Insurance Co., 765 P. 2d
857 (Utah 1988).

STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS
There are no statutes, rules or regulations pertinent to this
appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of Proceedings
This is an appeal from a summary judgment entered by the First
Judicial District Court in and for Box Elder County, State of Utah.

1

Statement of Facts
The following facts were assumed and undisputed before the
district court:
This is a breach of contract action in which appellant, Archie
Thurston, alleges he was terminated in violation of the terms of an
employee manual which governed his employment.
times material

to this action, Thurston was

R.19.

During all

employed

by the

respondent, Box Elder County, as an employee within the County Road
Department.

Thurston, a former road supervisor, held the position

of foreman at the time of his termination. R.20.
During November and December 1988, the Box Elder County
Commission

ordered

certain county

departments

initiate an employee reduction in force

and agencies to

("RIF").

County Road

Superintendent John Collom was ordered to lay off three employees
from the County Road Department.

R.20, 36.

On December 16, 1988,

Thurston was involuntarily terminated from his employment with Box
Elder County pursuant to the County Commission reduction in-workforce orders directed toward the county's road department.
The

position

held

by

Thurston,

lead

worker

or

R.20.

foreman, was

permanently eliminated as part of the reduction in force.

The

duties formerly performed by the foreman were taken over by the road
supervisor, in addition to his other responsibilities.

2

R.20-21.

In April 1988, approximately six months prior to Thurston's
layoff, Box Elder County published and maintained a personnel policy
and procedures manual

captioned

"Box Elder

County

Policy and

Procedures Manual." The Manual set forth personnel policies, rules
and

standards

governing

employee

reduction

in

work

force

circumstances, categories of rule infractions subject to employee
disciplinary action and an administrative grievance procedure for
the adjustment of employee grievances.

R.20.

Paragraph 11(F) of

the Manual provides in material part:
When circumstances (such as lack of funds or lack of
work) dictate that a reduction in force is needed, the
Elected Official or Department Head shall lay off the
necessary number of employees with consideration to the
length of service and/or individual performance.
R.21.

The parties agree that the above provision governed the

termination of Thurston in response to the County Commission's
reduction-in-force mandate.

R.22, 51-52.

At the time of Thurston's December 16, 1988, involuntary
termination from employment pursuant to reduction in work force
procedures, the county's road department employed approximately 2 8
employees,

approximately

20

of whom

had

less

seniority

than

Thurston. R.21.
In determining which employees should be laid off under the
reduction in force, Road Supervisor John Collom took into account
several

factors, including

issues of seniority
3

and

individual

performance.

Collom first considered laying off the employees with

the least amount of seniority, which would have been the truck
drivers.

However, Collom felt the department could not be run

properly without the truck drivers.

Collom also felt it would be

too disruptive to lay off the truck drivers and then fill those
positions with higher-level personnel, whose own positions would
then have to be filled by higher-level personnel, etc. Collom then
utilized a weighing process, considering which employees would best
serve the county if retained.

R.37-38.

After engaging in a weighing process, Collom determined that
Thurston was an appropriate person to lay off.

Collom felt that

Thurston did not have a good work attitude, which was reflected in
Thurston's job performance and dealings with Collom. An additional
factor supporting Collomfs decision was that Thurston had previously
stated that he had a job waiting if he were ever laid off.
38.

R.37-

The other two road department employees laid off were a

landfill worker who had been hired a short time before the RIF, and
another employee whose performance had deteriorated.

R.38.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Thurston was laid off from the County Road Department as part
of an undisputed, legitimate reduction in force.

Assuming that

Thurston's employment status was not terminable at will, the sole
issue raised is whether the County complied with the applicable
4

reduction-in-force provision of its personnel manual in terminating
Thurston's employment.
The applicable provision in the Manual states that layoffs due
to a reduction in force shall be made "with consideration to length
of service and/or individual performance."

The unrefuted evidence

establishes that the road superintendent considered both seniority
and individual performance in making his decision.

The fact that

the superintendent also considered other factors in reaching his
decision is not contrary to the Manual's terms.

Ordinary usage of

the word "consider" permits the County to weigh additional factors,
as long as at least one of the two named factors was considered.
The

superintendent's

consideration

of

four

instances of

deficient work performance for which Thurston was not formally
disciplined was also proper. Because the superintendent considered
Thurston's work performance in determining whom to lay off, Thurston
seeks to force the County to incorporate the Manual's disciplinary
procedures into the RIF provision.

That argument was expressly

rejected in Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Utah, Inc. , 777 P. 2d 483
(Utah 1989) , wherein this court held that an employer may rely upon
applicable RIF provisions when laying off an employee under a
legitimate RIF, even if the employer may have other reasons for
terminating the employee.

5

ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
Under Utah law, Thurston's employment with the County is
presumed to have been terminable at will. Berube v. Fashion Centre,
Ltd. , 771 P. 2d 1033 (Utah 1989).

For purposes of its motion for

summary judgment only, however, the County assumed that Thurston had
a protected interest in his employment, and that the terms of the
Box Elder County Policies and Procedures Manual
governed his termination.

("the

Manual")

Consequently, the only issue to be

decided is whether Thurston's termination was in compliance with the
Manual.
It is undisputed that Section 11(F) of the Manual sets forth
the applicable guidelines concerning reduction-in-force:
When circumstances (such as lack of funds or lack of
work) dictate that a reduction in force is needed, the
Elected Official or Department Head shall lay off the
necessary number of employees with consideration to the
length of service and/or individual performance.
On appeal, Thurston contends that his termination was contrary
to the provisions of the Manual, arguing:

(1) In selecting

employees to be laid off pursuant to the RIF, the County could not
consider any factors other than "length of service and/or individual
performance," and

(2) the County's consideration of "individual

performance" was restricted to review of Thurston's disciplinary
file.
6
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does

en.

iiut
jtecisinn.

See, e.g. .
- r,

:i

U.S.

842

(1984)

(requirement

that

Parole

Board

"consider" a

prisoner's record did not make that factor determinative; Board
could

deny

parole

regardless

of

prisoner's

record);

United

Brotherhood of Carpenters, etc. v. Industrial Commission, 363 S.W.2d
82,

90

(Mo.App.

1962)

(statutory

requirement

that

Commission

"consider" rates fixed by bargaining agreement did not require
Commission to follow or adopt those rates).
In this respect, Thurston concedes that Stewart v. Chevron
Chemical Co., 762 P.2d 1143 (Wash. 1988, en banc), is particularly
instructive.

In Stewart, the plaintiff was laid off by Chevron as

part of a reduction in force.

An employee manual provided that

"[i]n determining the sequence of layoffs due to lack of work,
consideration should be given to performance, experience and length
of service."

Id. at 1144.

Although the plaintiff was the most

senior employee, he was selected to be laid off, primarily because
of past poor performance.

He subsequently filed suit for wrongful

discharge, arguing that Chevron was required to consider all three
of the elements mentioned
seniority.

in the manual provision,

including

The Washington Supreme Court, en banc, reversed a

judgment in favor of plaintiff. Initially, the court noted that the
word "should" is discretionary, rather than mandatory.

As an

alternative ground, the court then analyzed the effect of the
"consideration" requirement:
8

Furthermore, Chevron was only required to "consider"
these factors; no relative weight or value is assigned
to any of the cri teria.
Thus, even if Chevron had
factored Stewart's length of service into its decision,
it was not required to give that criterion more weight
than performance, or any weight whatsoever if management
deemed it inadvisable to do so. Thus the wording of §
380 does not set forth the specificity necessary to
create a binding promise, . , . The layoff policy was
not a definite promise or commitment that Chevron would
give more weight to seniority, as Stewart appears to
argue, but was merely a guideline for management.
Id
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the disadvantages as well.
Under the common and ordinary sense of the word consider,
therefore, it was permissible for the County to consider all factors
relevant to a determination of which employees should be laid off
under the RIF.

Those factors included not only seniority and/or

individual performance, but also which employees1 duties might be
absorbed into other departments, and the availability of other
employment to the affected employeese
Governmental

bodies

should

be

given

latitude

in making

decisions necessary to accommodate budgetary constraints and to cut
costs. It is difficult to comprehend Thurstonfs contention that the
County should be penalized for concluding that, of employees who
might be terminated, it should lay off one who said he had a
position waiting rather than send another out into the community in
search of a job. The decision seems even more appropriate when the
first employee has not performed well for the County.
The same common sense approach compels the rejection of
Thurston's argument that an RIF does not permit the elimination of
a position within a department, but only allows for termination of
individual employees. Not surprisingly, Thurston cites no authority
for the novel proposition that a county is required to maintain an
unneeded position even when it has been ordered to cut the payroll.
If anything, Supervisor Collom should be commended for identifying
10
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consideration of the four examples in question affected the County's
decision.

In

any

event,

however,

Thurston's

position

is

insupportable.
Thurston's contention hinges on an assumption that section
11(F)

of

the

Manual, the

RIF

provision,

restricted

Collom's

evaluation to an examination of Thurston's disciplinary file. That
assumption is not supported by the language of section 11(F),
however, which provides only that RIF layoffs are to be made with
consideration to seniority and/or "individual performance." The RIF
clause does not refer to any other section of the Manual, such as
that governing disciplinary actions.
The RIF provision is located within a separate section of the
Manual, Section II, governing Employee Status Classification.

The

disciplinary procedures which Thurston wishes to incorporate into
the RIF provision are found in Section V of the Manual, which
addresses Disciplinary Action - Categories of Rules Infractions.
The various categories of infractions discussed in Thurston's brief
come into play only when disciplinary

action

is being taken.

Thurston's employment was terminated not as any kind of disciplinary
action, but as the result of a reduction in force.
This Court's recent decision in Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon &
Davis Utah, Inc., 777 P.2d 483 (Utah 1989) addressed precisely this
situation.

In Caldwell, the plaintiff was laid off as part of an
12
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•- theory:

His argument i s , ... jssence, that even when FB&; is
involuntarily terminating employees as part oi a
reduction in force, if it individually
evaluates
candidates for discharge and picks and chooses among
them rather than using some arbitrary mechanism for
determining who is discharged, such as a "last in, first
out" rule, it is, in fact, discharging those selected
for termination "for cause 11 and must follow the
procedures set out in bulletin N o . 9 0 2 . There is no
merit to this contention.
The language of the manual
does not require such a result. It plainly contemplates
that involuntary terminations other than those for cause
may be made by FB&D and does not limit the reasons for
which the employer may make them, and it certainly does
not require that reductions in force be based on some
arbitrary criteria.
. There is no genuine issue of material fact as to
whether FB&D w a s , in fact, conducting a reduction in
force or whether Caldwell w a s terminated as part of that
program.
That being the case, FB&D would have been
entitled to rely on paragraph 6(a) of "Operations
Bulletin N o . 2 0 2 " in effecting h i s termination.
Id. c t 186 (eiivphas,1 s added ) .

xJ

Ahich

The circumstances in this case are substantially the same.
The Box Elder County Policies and Procedures Manual contains one
provision which governs reduction in force, and a separate provision
which governs disciplinary matters. Thurston does not dispute that
layoffs were necessitated by a legitimate reduction in force. As
indicated in Caldwell, any additional reasons the County might have
for terminating Thurston are immaterial;

compliance with the RIF

provision relieves the County from liability.

For the same reason,

Thurston's allegation that Collom failed to inform him initially of
the reasons for his selection are immaterial.
Thurston's contention that the holding in Caldwell turned on
Caldwell's alleged at-will status is refuted by the language of the
decision itself. Although the defendant in Caldwell argued that the
plaintiff's employment was at will, its alternative argument, upon
which this Court based its decision, was that "even if the policy
Manual modified the at-will character of the employment relationship
by requiring FB&D to comply with its terms in discharging employees,
Caldwell was nevertheless legitimately terminated involuntarily as
a result of a reduction in force and his termination was handled
properly under Bulletin No. 202."

Xd. at 484.

Caldwell is thus

directly on point, and instructs that as long as the applicable RIF
provision
additional

is

satisfied,

reasons

for

the

fact

wishing
14

to

that

an

employer

terminate

an

may

have

employee

is

immaterial.
Significantly, Thurston states that
is

provisionally

correct

for

those

lf

[t]he County's argument

circumstances

where

the

individual performance credentials of two or more employees subject
to separation under a RIF action are being compared and the covered
conduct of each employee has not been subject to the disciplinary
action provisions of the Manual. Thurston's individual performance,
however, was never compared by Collom with that of any other County
Road Department employee."

(Brief of Appellant, p. 20.) Thurstonfs

argument overlooks the obvious fact that any assessment of one
employee's performance inherently involves a comparison with other
employees. Moreover, by his argument, Thurston seeks to rewrite the
Manual to require a specific comparison system in the event of an
RIF.

As the district court observed,
The Court is of the opinion that the discipline
procedures of the Personnel Policy and the reduction in
force considerations are separate and distinct and hcive
no relationship to each other and is not persuaded that
any performance matter to be considered in a reduction
in force setting must preliminarily have been considered
in a disciplinary setting. The Court also notes that
while it might have been advisable to consider any
performance of the Plaintiff in this case in a
relationship to other employee's, the Court finds that
there is no legal precedent which mandates such a
procedure and accordingly finds that the county is not
obligated to do so.
The unrefuted evidence established that the decision to lay

off Thurston under the RIF was made after careful consideration of
15

seniority and individual performance. The presence of other factors
more compelling than seniority made Thurston a logical choice for
termination. Thurstonfs termination was in full compliance with the
provisions of Section 11(F).

Under Caldwell, therefore, Thurston's

claims fail as a matter of law, and the summary judgment should be
affirmed.
CONCLUSION
For

the

above

reasons,

respondent

Box

Elder

County

respectfully requests that the summary judgment entered by the
district court be affirmed.
DATED this

day of December, 199 0.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.

Dale J. I^mbert
Karra J. Porter
Attorneys for Respondent
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ADDENDUM
MEMORANDUM DECISION

A-l

ORDER

A-5

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF BOX ELDER
STATE OF UTAH

ARCHIE W. THURSTON,
Plaintiff

MEMORANDUM DECISION

vs

Civil No. 890000166

BOX ELDER COUNTY,
Defendant
This matter came before the Court on Counter Motions for
Summary Judgment. The Court having read the motions, supporting
documents and affidavits and counter pleadings of the parties and
having heard oral arguments now issues the following Memorandum
Decision:
MEMORANDUM DECISION
The issue presented before the Court is whether the
procedures followed by the County in a reduction in force issue were
appropriate as applied to this Plaintiff. It being conceded by the
parties that there was a reduction in force not only of the
Plaintiff in this action but, other individuals as well.
It is agreed by both parties that the relevant provision
involved in this action is contained in the Box Elder County's
Personnel Policies and Procedures Manual adopted April 26, 1988 and
specifically # II F Reduction in Workforce . The revelant language
is quoted in this opinion in total as follows: "When circumstances
(such as lack of funds or lack of work) indicate that a reduction in
force is needed, the Elected Official or Department Head shall lay
off the necessary number of employees with consideration to length
of service and/or individual performance.
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This case hinges on the definition of the word
"consideration1' and the effect to be given thereto and its
application in this fact situation.
The Court is of the opinion that the discipline proceduresof
the Personnel Policy and the reduction in force considerations are
separate and distinct and have no relationship to each other and is
not persuaded that any performance matter to be considered in a
reduction in force setting must preliminarily have been considered
in a disciplinary setting. The Court also notes that while it might
have been advisable to consider any performance of the Plaintiff in
this case in a relationship to other employee1s, the Court finds
that there is no legal precedent which mandates such a procedure and
accordingly finds that the county is not obligated to do so.
As to the interpretation of the word "consider", both parties
have referred to the Chevron case in their briefs and the language
of the Court therein. In the opinion of the Court, the critical
language in that case is that the provisions of referring to
consideration of these factors were given "merely as a guideline for
management". It is also unrealistic in the view of the Court to
assume that if the Courts can indicate as they did in the Chevron
case, that no relative weight or value is assigned to any of the
criteria including the fact that "they may not give any weight
whatsoever if management deemed it inadvisable to do so", that
thereby the County would be procluded from considering any other
factors. In the view of the Court even though there may be some
equitable reasons for weighting factors differently than the County
may have done in this case, the status of the law is that in
reduction in force provisions such as the one before the Court the
employer is only required to consider and give such weight as they
determine appropriate to the factors enumerated and that they are
not precluded from considering other factors in addition to those
enumerated The uncontroverted
A-2
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affidavits of the County indicate that in fact the criteria were
both considered, that there was concern expressed to the employee
concerning his individual performance and that in addition to these
factors, other factors were considered such as the opportunity for
the employees to obtain outside employment if in fact due to the
reduction in force he was terminated.
Accordingly, for the reasons contained herein, the
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is Granted, there being no
genuine issue of a material fact remaining and the Trial Setting in
this matter is vacated.
Counsel for Defendant to prepare an order for the Court
consistant with this opinion and submit the same to Counsel for
Plaintiff for approval as to form.
DATED this

•4

_ day of December, 1989

AU.

F.L. GUNNELL
DISTRICT JUDGE
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION, postage prepaid, to the following:
Philip C. Patterson, Attorney at Law, 427 27th Street, Ogden, UT
84401-4291, Karra J. Porter & Dale J. Lambert, Attorneys at Law, 510
Clark Learning Building, 175 South West Temple, Salt Lake City, UT
84101 and Jon J. Bunderson, Box Elder County Attorney, 45 North
East, Brigham City, UT

84302.

DATED this 15th day of December, 1989.
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Dale J. Lambert, 1871
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.
510 Clark Learning Building
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 355-3431
Jon Bunderson, 0487
County Attorney
Box Elder County
One South Main
Brigham City, UT 84302
Telephone: (801) 734-9464

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ARCHIE W. THURSTON,

ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. 89 0000 166

BOX ELDER COUNTY,
Defendant.
The Court having
representing

the

heard

plaintiff

the

and

oral

the

arguments

of counsel

defendant, the motions,

supporting documents, affidavits and other pleadings on file herein
and good cause appearing therefor:
NOW THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted and
plaintiff's

Motion

for

Summary
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Judgment

is

hereby

denied;

Case No J ¥ ^ / ^ - i f
JAN
^ 1

in,.

21989

Consistent with

this Order, plaintiff's

dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this /[fin

Complaint

is hereby

'

day of Daeember, *9Q9~.
BY THE COURT:

By:.

\L

u.

District Court Judge

Philip c. Ratterson
Attorney for Plaintiff
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This is to certify that on the

day of December, 1990,

a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT was
mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Philip C. Patterson
427 - 27th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401-4291
Attorney for Appellant

Dale J. L/ambert
Karra J. Porter

